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*
The Bank of Canada intervened repeatedly during  • 
the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis to provide extraordinary 
liquidity directly to ﬁ  nancial market participants in 
order to stabilize the ﬁ  nancial system. 
Over this period, the Bank’s traditional liquidity  • 
framework was expanded in four key areas: terms 
to maturity, amounts, counterparties, and eligible 
securities. 
New liquidity tools were developed in accordance  • 
with a set of guiding principles. 
Although the regular term PRA facility was the  • 
most heavily used, the availability of all of the 
Bank’s extraordinary liquidity facilities may have 
mitigated market stress and helped to restore 
well-functioning markets.
T
he Bank of Canada fosters the safety and 
efﬁ  ciency of the ﬁ  nancial system, both in 
Canada and internationally. One of the means 
used by the Bank to achieve this goal is to provide 
liquidity to the ﬁ  nancial institutions, ﬁ  nancial markets, 
and payment, clearing, and settlement systems that 
form Canada’s ﬁ  nancial system. During the recent 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, the Bank of Canada developed a 
series of new liquidity tools, and used its traditional 
tools as well, to stabilize the ﬁ  nancial system and limit 
the repercussions to the Canadian economy. 
At the onset of the crisis, which began in August 2007 
and continued into 2009, global credit markets 
experienced sharp reductions in market liquidity, 
which caused some ﬁ  nancial institutions to experi-
ence considerable trading losses.
1 Financial institu-
tions around the world generally became more 
cautious about lending to each other and began to 
hoard liquidity for precautionary purposes. The 
resulting increase in interbank borrowing costs spread 
to other markets. As funding costs increased and 
funding liquidity declined, the capacity and willingness 
of ﬁ  nancial institutions to make markets was reduced. 
This contributed to further declines in market liquidity. 
At several points during the period, interbank lending 
and other short-term funding markets ceased to exist 
for terms greater than overnight. As risk aversion 
increased, institutions became reluctant to extend 
credit more broadly, with serious economic implica-
tions worldwide. 
Given this backdrop, central banks and governments 
around the world undertook a number of unpreced-
ented actions to stabilize the ﬁ  nancial system and 
1  There are three types of liquidity relevant to ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Market liquidity refers to the ease with which ﬁ  nancial asset 
positions of reasonable size can be traded with little price impact. 
Funding liquidity refers to the ability of solvent institutions to obtain 
immediate means of payment to meet liabilities coming due. Central 
bank liquidity refers to access to money from the central bank.
*  Walter Engert is now with the Ofﬁ  ce of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions.
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Financial Market Turmoil
During the summer and fall of 2007, the worsening 
performance of subprime mortgages in the United 
States led to investor concerns about asset-backed 
securities (ABS) backed in whole or in part by these 
mortgages. These concerns motivated a broad 
repricing of risk, ﬁ  rst in the market for structured 
products, but then more broadly in global credit 
markets. Market participants became concerned 
about the ﬁ  nancial health of counterparties, particu-
larly of banks whose capital was perceived to be 
eroding, as trading losses mounted and reintermedia-
tion from securitized products occurred. This led to a 
signiﬁ  cant increase in interest rate spreads and a 
reduction in liquidity in short-term bank-funding 
markets in many countries
4 (Chart 1 shows spreads 
between the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), 
the European Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR), and 
the Canadian Dealer Offered Rate (CDOR) and the 
rates for overnight index swaps (OIS) in their respect-
ive regions). There is evidence that this increase in 
spreads, at least in Canada, reﬂ  ected increases in 
both credit and liquidity risks. (See Garcia and Yang, 
this issue, for evidence using spreads on credit 
default swaps.)
In Canada, the immediate effects were most acute in 
the market for the short-term debt of banks and 
corporations. The market for asset-backed commer-
cial paper (ABCP) froze, and Canadian-bank issuers 
4  For a more detailed review of the circumstances that led to the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, see Carney (2008a) and International Monetary Fund 
(2007).
reduce the severity of the ensuing global recession.
2 
The Bank of Canada, along with other central banks, 
intervened repeatedly to provide liquidity to ﬁ  nancial 
market participants to mitigate the risks of serious 
ﬁ  nancial disturbances and improve credit conditions. 
This article is focused on the liquidity actions taken by 
the Bank during this period to ensure that adequate 
liquidity was available to key ﬁ  nancial institutions in 
Canada.
The Bank’s decisions to intervene in markets were 
based on judgments that its actions could reduce the 
liquidity distortions, and that the beneﬁ  ts of alleviating 
ﬁ  nancial system dysfunction would outweigh the 
potential costs of taking on additional ﬁ  nancial risk 
and creating incentives for moral hazard (Engert, 
Selody, and Wilkins 2008). The Bank’s provision of 
extraordinary liquidity has been guided by the follow-
ing ﬁ  ve principles.
Intervention should target distortions of system- (i) 
wide importance. 
Intervention should be graduated, commensurate  (ii) 
with the severity of the problem. 
The means of intervention should be well  (iii) 
designed, using tools appropriate for the problem 
being addressed. 
Intervention should be efﬁ  cient and non-distortion- (iv) 
ary. 
Measures should be taken to mitigate moral  (v) 
hazard. 
The following section reviews the extraordinary 
liquidity measures taken by the Bank to stabilize the 
ﬁ  nancial system.
3 This is followed by a discussion of 
how the Bank applied the guiding principles set out 
above. An overview is then provided of how the 
various liquidity facilities implemented by the Bank in 
the past two years were used, including an assess-
ment of their performance. The ﬁ  nal section outlines 
outstanding issues for future consideration.
2 See  Appendixes 1 and 2 for summaries of the initiatives undertaken 
over the 2007–09 period by the Bank of Canada and the federal 
government, respectively, in support of the ﬁ  nancial system. A 
summary of the international initiatives, beginning in September 
2008, is available at: <http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_
economy/policyresponses.html>.  
3  All data presented in this article are updated to 30 October 2009. 
Chart 1:  Spreads between 3-month interbank offered 
ratesa and overnight index swap rates
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2007, supplied major ﬁ  nancial institutions with liquidity 
at the shortest term and helped to contain overnight 
ﬁ  nancing rates close to the Bank’s target (Chart 2).
7 
(These traditional liquidity tools were effective 
throughout the period of ﬁ  nancial market turmoil and 
continue to be an important component of the 
implementation of monetary policy in Canada.) In 
addition, the Bank’s Standing Liquidity Facility con-
tinued to be available to address any temporary short-
falls of settlement balances in Canada’s large-value 
payment system.
8 As well, the Bank stood ready to 
provide emergency lending assistance to solvent 
ﬁ  nancial institutions facing serious and persistent 
liquidity problems.
9 
As the situation deteriorated, the Bank gradually 
expanded its liquidity framework in four areas: terms 
7  The unusually large negative gap in August and September 2007 
between collateralized overnight ﬁ  nancing rates (the Canadian 
overnight repo rate average [CORRA] and the money market 
ﬁ  nancing rate) and the Bank’s target rate did not reﬂ  ect broader 
overnight funding conditions. Indicators of uncollateralized overnight 
rates, such as overnight Northbound (U.S.-dollar/Canadian-dollar) 
swap rates and overnight Canadian-dollar LIBOR rates, were 
signiﬁ  cantly higher than the target rate; this was corroborated by 
anecdotal evidence from market participants. This suggests that, at 
the time, some segmentation between domestic and foreign ﬁ  nancial 
institutions was likely occurring in overnight funding markets. 
8  The Standing Liquidity Facility supports settlement in the Large Value 
Transfer System (LVTS) by providing collateralized overnight loans to 
direct participants in the system that are experiencing temporary 
shortfalls in their settlement balances. For more information, see 
Engert, Gravelle, and Howard (2008). 
9  See Bank of Canada (2004) for the Bank’s lender-of-last-resort 
policies. 
of ABCP were forced to take these securities back 
onto their balance sheets.
5 In an environment of 
increasing risk aversion, this restricted the ability of 
these institutions to meet their funding needs and 
made them more cautious with respect to liquidity 
management. Short-term credit markets—speciﬁ  cally 
ABCP, commercial paper (CP), bankers’ acceptances 
(BAs), and interbank lending—as well as repo markets 
experienced sharp declines in market liquidity and 
large increases in spreads relative to expected 
overnight interest rates. For a short time in Canada, 
there was a reluctance to lend in the money market 
for terms longer than a few days, and for several 
months, activity in some short-term markets (e.g., CP) 
was reduced for terms greater than one week.
The Bank of Canada 
responded rapidly at the 
onset of the crisis, using its 
traditional liquidity tools.
The Bank of Canada responded rapidly at the onset 
of the crisis, using its traditional liquidity tools. At the 
time, the focus of the Bank’s liquidity framework was 
to reinforce the target for the overnight rate (the key 
means for achieving the Bank’s monetary policy 
objectives and the anchor of the yield curve) by 
adjusting overnight liquidity through transactions with 
a limited set of counterparties on the basis of the 
most liquid, high-quality securities. As pressures in 
short-term funding markets emerged, the Bank 
intervened by conducting overnight buyback oper-
ations of Government of Canada (GoC) securities 
with primary dealers and by increasing daily excess 
settlement balances in the ﬁ  nancial system.
6 
5  See Kamhi and Tuer (2007) for a review of the developments 
regarding ABCP in Canada. 
6  The target for the overnight interest rate can be reinforced through 
transactions using overnight special purchase and resale agreements 
(SPRAs) or sale and repurchase agreements (SRAs) at the target 
overnight rate. SPRAs are used to inject intraday liquidity if the 
collateralized overnight rate is trading above the target, and SRAs are 
used to withdraw intraday liquidity if the collateralized overnight rate 
is trading below the target. Typically, these transactions are sterilized 
at the end of the day (i.e., the cash impact of these transactions on 
the level of settlement balances in the ﬁ  nancial system is offset), 
leaving daily aggregate liquidity unchanged. The Bank can also 
adjust target end-of-day settlement balances in the ﬁ  nancial system 
to relieve pressures on the overnight interest rate. For more 
information on these and related considerations, see Engert, 
Gravelle, and Howard (2008). 
Chart 2:  Spreads between overnight rates in Canada 
and the target for the overnight rate
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approximation of bank funding costs, and OIS rates to 
estimate expected overnight rates.
12) These pressures 
diminished somewhat in the new year, only to re-
emerge in March 2008 when Bear Stearns, a major 
U.S. investment bank, began experiencing severe 
credit and liquidity problems.
13 
To address these heightened pressures in short-term 
funding markets, in December 2007, the Bank of 
Canada conducted term purchase and resale agree-
ments (PRAs) with primary dealers against an 
expanded set of eligible securities, with maturities 
12  CDOR is the average bid rate on Canadian BAs for speciﬁ  c terms to 
maturity, determined daily from a survey of principal market-makers, 
and provides the basis for a ﬂ  oating reference rate in Canadian-dollar 
wholesale and interest rate swap transactions. Since BA issuance 
and rates can vary widely across banks, CDOR is an imperfect meas-
ure of bank funding costs. 
13  Bear Stearns experienced staggering losses on its securities portfolio 
and could not meet its obligations to creditors. The Federal Reserve 
averted the collapse of Bear Stearns by facilitating its purchase by 
JPMorgan Chase. 
to maturity, amounts, counterparties, and eligible 
securities.
10 Figure 1 summarizes this evolution.
11 
The trigger for the expansion of the Bank’s liquidity 
framework came in the latter part of 2007. The ﬁ  nan-
cial reporting requirements of global banks (at ﬁ  scal 
year-ends) and related increases in funding needs had 
exacerbated the continuing desire to maintain a high 
level of balance-sheet liquidity. When combined with 
concerns about the soundness of some global 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, credit market liquidity was 
further reduced around the world, including in 
Canada, and yield spreads rose on a broad range of 
credit assets. The spread between the rates in 
Canadian term money markets and the expected 
overnight rate increased markedly in late 2007. 
10  Other central banks took similar measures proportional to the 
severity of the ﬁ  nancial market turmoil being experienced in their 
respective regions. See CGFS (2008) for a discussion of central bank 
actions up to the spring of 2008.  
11  Amendments to the Bank of Canada Act came into force on 5 August 
2008, providing the Bank with greater ﬂ  exibility to purchase and sell 
a wider range of securities for the purposes of conducting monetary 
policy and supporting ﬁ  nancial system stability. See Bank of Canada 
(2008) for more on these provisions. 
Figure 1:  Evolution of the Bank of Canada’s liquidity framework, 2007—09
 2007  2008  2009
 Source: Bank of Canada
December 2007:
1-month term • 
 PRAs  introduced
Spring/Summer 2008:
Asset-backed commercial paper  • 
  and U.S. Treasury securities 
  accepted as collateral under 
  the Standing Liquidity Facility
Amendments to BoC Act come  • 
 into  force
February 2009:
Term PRA for  • 




1- and 3-month term PRAs introduced.   • 
  Frequency and size of operations increased; 
  list of eligible counterparties and assets expanded
Term PRA for private sector money market  • 
 instruments  introduced
Term loan facility introduced • 
U.S.-dollar swap facility announced • 
Non-mortgage loan portfolio accepted as  • 
  collateral under the Standing Liquidity Facility
Spring 2009:
Framework for monetary  • 
  policy at the effective 
  lower bound introduced 
6-, 9-, and 12-month term  • 
 PRAs  introduced
Prospective sunset dates • 
  for extraordinary liquidity 
 measures  announced
Summer/Fall 2007:
Traditional tools  • 
 (overnight  SPRAs 
  and excess settlement
 balances)  used 
 to  address 
 liquidity  pressures
Fall 2009:
Term loan  • 
 facility  expires
Term PRA for  • 
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Bank announced that it would not renew maturing 
term PRA. 
Severe ﬁ  nancial market pressures re-emerged in the 
fall of 2008, sparked by a series of failures and 
near-failures of ﬁ  nancial institutions in the United 
States and Europe. The most signiﬁ  cant was the 
bankruptcy, in September 2008, of Lehman Brothers, 
a major U.S. ﬁ  nancial institution. Concerns intensiﬁ  ed 
about ﬁ  nancial institution losses and capital 
adequacy, and already tight liquidity conditions in 
short-and long-term funding markets around the 
world became even more restrictive. By early October 
2008, the ability of both ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial 
borrowers to obtain market-based ﬁ  nancing was 
seriously impaired in global markets. Credit spreads 
spiked to unprecedented levels, and interbank and 
wholesale funding markets ceased to exist in many 
countries for terms longer than overnight.
The deterioration in Canadian ﬁ  nancial markets was 
much less severe than elsewhere (Chart 1), although 
liquidity was limited at all maturities, and trading 
volumes were thin. Demand for BAs and ABCP was 
limited to maturities of less than one month, and the 
spread between CDOR and the expected overnight 
rate hit record levels (Chart 3). Canadian ﬁ  nancial 
institutions became increasingly more conservative 
in their management of liquidity and their balance 
sheets, which adversely affected funding and market 
liquidity more generally.
The Bank aggressively expanded its 
provision of liquidity by transacting 
more frequently with a broader 
range of counterparties, for longer 
terms, and against a wider range 
of eligible securities.
The Bank of Canada acted promptly to ensure that 
adequate liquidity was available to ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions operating in Canada. First, term PRA trans-
actions, under the existing terms and conditions, 
were quickly resumed on 19 September. The Bank 
also expanded its reciprocal currency swap arrange-
ment with the Federal Reserve on 18 September, 
in order to be able to provide up to $10 billion of 
U.S.-dollar funding to domestic ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
if necessary. (Such a need has never materialized in 
extending over the 2007 year-end.
14 This marked the 
ﬁ  rst time that liquidity operations extending beyond 
one business day were conducted to support funding 
liquidity; prior to December 2007, term PRAs had only 
been conducted on an occasional basis to address 
seasonal ﬂ  uctuations in the demand for bank notes.
15 
Term PRAs were offered again beginning in March 
2008 on a biweekly basis. The Bank also expanded 
the set of assets acceptable as collateral to secure 
intraday exposures in the LVTS and, correspondingly, 
for loans provided under the Standing Liquidity 
Facility, to include certain types of ABCP
16 (in March 
2008) and U.S. Treasury securities (in June 2008). 
These assets could replace other, more-liquid collat-
eral pledged in the LVTS, which, in turn, could be 
used more easily by ﬁ  nancial institutions to obtain 
market-based funding. 
As pressures in global ﬁ  nancial markets eased 
temporarily during the spring of 2008, the Bank 
wound down its term PRA operations. By June 2008, 
funding conditions in Canadian money markets for 
terms up to three months had improved relative to 
14  The primary dealers are BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., Casgrain & 
Company Ltd., CIBC World Markets Inc., Desjardins Securities Inc., 
Deutsche Bank Securities Ltd., HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc., Merrill 
Lynch Canada Inc., Laurentian Bank Securities Inc., National Bank 
Financial, RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., and the 
Toronto-Dominion Bank.
15  The Bank of Canada can purchase GoC securities via term repo 
transactions to temporarily increase its assets to offset a temporary 
increase in its bank note liabilities.
16  There are strict eligibility requirements for ABCP securities, such that 
only those securities with minimal credit and liquidity risk are 
accepted. See: <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/notices_
fmd/2009/securities_collateral060309.pdf>.
Chart 3:  Spreads between Canadian bank funding 
costs and the expected overnight rate
Note: The Canadian Dealer Offered Rate (CDOR) is used to approximate bank funding costs, 
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These measures enabled direct participants in the 
LVTS to use their non-marketable, illiquid balance-
sheet assets as collateral for these speciﬁ  c purposes, 
thus permitting them to use conventional, liquid 
collateral elsewhere.
Second, on 14 October, the Bank introduced a term 
PRA facility aimed at other non-traditional counter-
parties—participants in the money market (ABCP, 
BAs, CP). This facility was expanded in February 2009 
to provide liquidity to participants in Canadian private 
sector bond markets as well, and the list of securities 
accepted as collateral under this facility was corres-
pondingly broadened to include investment-grade 
corporate bonds.
These various measures increased the amount of 
term liquidity outstanding to a peak of over $40 billion 
by December 2008, as shown in Chart 4.
With the passing of year-end 2008, the initiatives 
taken by central banks and governments around the 
world began to have an impact, and the global 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil dissipated. Funding conditions, 
particularly for terms of three months or less, and the 
liquidity of bank balance sheets improved. This was 
echoed in Canadian money markets more generally, 
as improvements in bank liquidity positions encour-
aged their intermediary and market-making activities. 
The Bank continued to offer extraordinary liquidity 
through its various facilities on a weekly basis, and the 
outstanding amounts remained at relatively elevated 
levels into the spring. (The Bank also eased liquidity 
conditions by further reducing its target overnight rate 
Canada, nor was it expected to.)
17 This was part of 
various coordinated central bank actions designed to 
address elevated pressures in U.S.-dollar short-term 
funding markets.
18
Shortly afterwards, the Bank aggressively expanded 
its provision of liquidity by transacting more frequently 
with a broader range of counterparties, for longer 
terms, and against a wider range of eligible securities. 
In particular, in response to increased pressures in 
term funding markets, the Bank again conducted term 
PRAs, but the frequency was increased to weekly 
(from the biweekly schedule followed earlier), eligible 
counterparties were expanded to include LVTS 
participants in addition to primary dealers, and a 
3-month PRA maturity was added.
19 The Bank also 
temporarily broadened the list of securities eligible as 
assets in term PRA transactions to include own-
issued ABCP, much of which had been taken back 
onto the balance sheets of banks.
The Bank also took other measures to improve 
liquidity conditions. First, on 17 October 2008, the 
Bank decided to temporarily accept as collateral the 
Canadian-dollar non-mortgage loan portfolios of 
LVTS direct participants (at a collateral-to-portfolio 
value of 60 per cent). Initially, these assets were 
eligible to secure intraday exposures in the LVTS and, 
correspondingly, to secure loans under the Standing 
Liquidity Facility. Then, on 12 November, the Bank 
introduced a term loan facility for direct participants in 
the LVTS, also secured by Canadian-dollar non-mort-
gage loan portfolios. Through a weekly auction, the 
term loan facility provided a backstop source of 
collateralized funding at competitively determined 
17  Shortly afterward, the arrangement was expanded to provide up to 
$30 billion in U.S.-dollar funding. This agreement between the Bank 
of Canada and the Federal Reserve has since been extended to 
1 February 2010. The need to use this facility has not arisen because 
difﬁ  culties with U.S.-dollar funding mainly occurred in overseas 
markets, owing to time zone differentials and larger U.S.-dollar 
requirements. In addition, the major banks in Canada have U.S. 
operations and access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window for 
U.S.-dollar funds.
18  In addition, in early October 2008, the Bank reduced its target 
overnight rate by 50 basis points in a move coordinated with other 
central banks to ease the pressure on global monetary conditions. 
This step was taken outside of the Bank’s schedule for the setting of 
the target overnight rate. This was quickly followed by further rate 
cuts in Canada, for a cumulative reduction of 200 basis points 
between October 2008 and January 2009. 
19  The LVTS participants are Alberta Treasury Branches, Bank of 
America National Assoc., Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, 
BNP Paribas (Canada), Caisse centrale Desjardins, Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce, Credit Union Central of Canada, HSBC Bank 
Canada, Laurentian Bank of Canada, National Bank of Canada, Royal 
Bank of Canada, State Street Bank and Trust Company, and the 
Toronto-Dominion Bank. The securities dealer afﬁ  liates of eight of 
these participants are Bank of Canada primary dealers. 
Chart 4:  Amounts outstanding under the Bank’s 
liquidity facilitiesa
End-of-week par values a. 
Term PRA for private sector money market instruments before 20 March 2009 b. 
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systemwide importance
Application of the Bank of Canada’s traditional 
liquidity tools was the appropriate response in the 
early stages of the ﬁ  nancial market turmoil, given that 
problems were limited to a relatively small segment of 
ﬁ  nancial markets. When it became clear that liquidity 
distortions were taking on systemwide importance, 
the Bank intervened. Particularly at the end of 2007 
and during the fourth quarter of 2008, money markets 
were not functioning efﬁ  ciently, and this had broader 
implications for the ﬁ  nancial system as the normal 
generation of liquidity among system participants 
broke down. Increasing uncertainty related to credit 
and liquidity risk caused a reduction in money market 
activity, reduced the overall supply of liquidity, and 
inhibited its distribution among market participants. 
Investors grew increasingly cautious, and banks 
became more conservative in managing risk. As 
access to short-term funding decreased with respect 
to both amounts and maturities, market-making and 
lending activities were also sufﬁ  ciently constrained 
so as to pose serious risks to the ﬁ  nancial system. 
Consequently, the Bank of Canada expanded its role 
to provide funding liquidity directly to market partici-
pants to stabilize the ﬁ  nancial system and to limit 
spillover effects to the broader economy.
When it became clear that 
liquidity distortions were taking 
on systemwide importance, 
the Bank intervened.
Principle (ii): Intervention should be 
graduated, commensurate with the 
severity of the problem
As the severity of the conditions changed, so too 
did the Bank’s actions. Initially, funding difﬁ  culties at 
ﬁ  nancial institutions were addressed by injecting 
liquidity through traditional channels; i.e., by offering 
overnight liquidity via open market operations with 
primary dealers, which could then be channelled 
through to other borrowers in need of liquidity. As 
market funding pressures persisted and extended 
into longer maturities in late 2007 and early 2008, the 
Bank correspondingly offered term liquidity, again 
through its traditional counterparties, as conditions 
warranted. As the credit and liquidity pressures 
intensiﬁ  ed in the fall of 2008, the Bank’s response 
at its January, March, and April 2009 ﬁ  xed announce-
ment dates.) In April 2009, regular term PRA oper-
ations became part of the Bank’s framework to 
implement monetary policy at the effective lower 
bound for overnight interest rates (see Box, p.10). 
Into the summer and fall of 2009, ﬁ  nancial market 
conditions continued to improve, and participation at 
central bank liquidity operations indicated a reduced 
need for the Bank’s liquidity support. Prospective 
sunset dates for all of the Bank’s extraordinary 
liquidity operations were announced at the end of 
June.
20 At the end of July, the Bank lowered its 
pre-announced minimum amounts for the regular 
term PRA auctions as well as that for the term PRA for 
private sector instruments and the term loan facility. 
The Bank subsequently announced on 22 September 
that, at the end of October, the term loan facility 
and the term PRA facility for private sector instruments 
would expire and the frequency of regular term 
PRA auctions would be reduced to biweekly from 
weekly. Despite a reduction in the amount offered at 
each PRA auction, the longer maturity proﬁ  le of these 
operations (in support of the Bank’s conditional 
commitment) maintained the amount of term 
liquidity outstanding at about $27.5 billion by the 
end of October 2009. Finally, improved conditions in 
funding markets prompted the Bank to announce on 
5 November that, beginning on 2 February 2010, it 
would gradually phase out its temporary measure 
allowing LVTS participants to assign their non-mort-
gage loan portfolios as eligible collateral for LVTS and 
Standing Liquidity Facility purposes.
Applying the Bank of Canada’s 
Principles for Intervention
As noted above, in developing these additional 
liquidity tools during the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the Bank was 
guided by a set of principles. This section considers 
how those principles were followed in practice.
21
20 On 25 June, the Bank announced that the regular term PRA would 
continue through to at least 31 January 2010; assignment of the 
non-mortgage loan portfolio as collateral for the Standing Liquidity 
Facility would continue until at least 1 February 2010; the term 
PRA for private sector instruments and the term loan facility would 
continue through to at least the end of October 2009; and that 
the reciprocal currency swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve 
was extended to 1 February 2010.
21 As explained in Longworth (2008), the Bank’s actions, including the 
development of new liquidity policies and principles, were inﬂ  uenced 
by ongoing work in the BIS Committee on the Global Financial 
System and the Markets Committee that was aimed at strengthening 
central bank effectiveness in dealing with liquidity problems. See, for 
example, CGFS (2008).
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Term Liquidity Operations at the Effective Lower Bound 
for Overnight Rates
On 21 April 2009, the Bank of Canada announced 
that it would reduce its target for the overnight rate 
to 25 basis points, which it considers to be the 
effective lower bound (ELB) for that rate. It also 
committed to holding its policy rate at 25 basis 
points until the end of June 2010, conditional on the 
outlook for inﬂ  ation. The Bank Rate, the rate at 
which LVTS participants access overdraft loans via 
the Standing Liquidity Facility, was correspondingly 
lowered to 50 basis points.
1
Several changes were made to the Bank’s liquidity 
facilities to reinforce the Bank’s conditional commit-
ment, as well as to preserve the effective func-
tioning of markets in a low interest rate environ-
ment.
2
First, minimum and maximum bid rates corres- • 
ponding to the target overnight rate and the 
Bank Rate, respectively, were introduced for 
the regular term PRA facility. The minimum bid 
rate for the term PRA facility for private sector 
instruments was changed to the target overnight 
rate plus 25 basis points.
Second, a portion of the Bank’s existing stock of  • 
1- and 3-month regular term PRAs were rolled 
over into 6- and 12-month terms. (In July 2009, 
the longest term for the regular term PRA was 
reduced from 12 months to 9 months and, in 
October, to 6 months; as of 31 October 2009, 
the longest maturity extends to 21 July 2010.)
1  The deposit rate, i.e., the interest rate paid on settlement 
balances (deposits) held at the Bank by direct participants in the 
LVTS, remained at 25 basis points. Because institutions would 
not have the incentive to lend at market rates below the deposit 
rate when they can earn that rate on balances held at the Bank, 
the deposit rate would provide a ﬂ  oor for the overnight rate.
2  At very low interest rates, there is less incentive to participate in 
markets, owing to the compression of spreads and the corres-
ponding reduction in potential trading proﬁ  ts.
Third, a new standing overnight PRA facility was  • 
introduced for primary dealers, where funds 
could be accessed at the Bank Rate at their 
discretion rather than at the discretion of the 
Bank.
The Bank also created excess settlement  • 
balances in the ﬁ  nancial system; i.e., signiﬁ  cantly 
more aggregate balances than required by 
direct participants in the LVTS. The Bank’s 
target for daily settlement balances increased 
from $25 million to $3 billion.
With these changes, the Bank’s term liquidity 
operations began to serve two objectives: ﬁ  nancial 
system stability and monetary policy. greater assurance of meeting their liquidity needs.
22 
Creditors, in turn, should be more willing to fund 
institutions that have access to term PRA because of 
the greater assurance of timely repayment (reduced 
counterparty risk). Moreover, PRAs that are offered 
through auction may also help price discovery at a 
time when price discovery is impaired. From the 
perspective of ﬁ  nancial institutions, the term PRA 
facilities were effective because they provided a 
means of temporary funding and supported a return 
to more normal market conditions, at which point 
private sector sources of funding became more 
readily available.
Principle (iv): Minimize market distortions
The liquidity facilities introduced by the Bank were 
designed to minimize the risk of market distortion. 
The facilities use an auction mechanism to allocate 
liquidity so that the price of liquidity is determined 
competitively by the participants, rather than by the 
Bank of Canada. The simultaneous and anonymous 
participation of many ﬁ  nancial institutions may also 
minimize the potential for stigma that might be 
attached to receiving funds from the central bank 
under conditions of heightened risk aversion in 
ﬁ  nancial markets. Both the term PRA facility for 
private sector instruments and the term loan facility 
were designed as backstop facilities with appropriate 
minimum bid rates, which provided the Bank with a 
natural means to exit from these facilities when 
market sources of liquidity were a more cost-effective 
alternative for potential participants. In addition, the 
facilities were designed to preserve the existing 
market structures. For example, in the term PRA 
facility for private sector instruments, bidding by 
private sector market participants was done through 
primary dealers, which reduced the risk that the Bank 
of Canada would crowd out traditional market-mak-
ers. Primary dealers were not eligible counterparties 
for these term funds, because they have access to the 
regular term PRA. Primary dealers could only bid 
indirectly on behalf of those who were eligible. Finally, 
intervention is aimed at mitigating liquidity risk that, in 
the Bank’s judgment, is not in line with fundamentals; 
it does not attempt to alter credit risk.
22 Chapman and Martin (2007) support the notion of providing central 
bank liquidity through a tiered structure, because the provision of 
liquidity by the central bank to all market participants more broadly 
can distort the price of credit risk in the market to which the liquidity 
is provided. When a central bank has relatively less information than 
market participants, it should delegate the monitoring of credit risk to 
a subset of the market.
escalated. Communications and actions were 
coordinated across central banks in recognition of the 
global nature of the problems and potential effects, 
and the Bank provided extraordinary term liquidity for 
larger amounts, for longer terms, to a broader set of 
counterparties, at more frequent intervals, and on the 
basis of a wider range of eligible securities. As general 
market conditions improved throughout the spring 
and into the early fall, the Bank gradually reduced the 
amounts of liquidity offered and discontinued facilities 
that were no longer required. The Bank’s interventions 
thus evolved in accordance with the severity of the 
ﬁ  nancial market dysfunction.
Principle (iii): Intervention must be well-
designed; use the right tools for the job
As the market turbulence intensiﬁ  ed in the fall of 2008, 
liquidity was not being reliably channelled beyond the 
Bank’s traditional counterparties, nor was it access-
ible beyond the shortest terms or on the security of 
any but the most liquid and high-quality collateral. The 
Bank addressed this problem by providing liquidity to 
a wider range of ﬁ  nancial institutions, at longer than 
usual terms, against a wider range of collateral. More 
speciﬁ  cally, money market liquidity problems were 
addressed by the Bank’s term PRA facilities, while the 
term loan facility made liquidity available for ﬁ  nancial 
institutions that may have had some difﬁ  culties in 
managing their balance sheets but whose difﬁ  culties 
were not serious enough to warrant emergency 
lending assistance. Further, adjustments in LVTS 
collateral enabled the release of conventional collat-
eral for other uses (including term PRA with the Bank) 
and facilitated the subsequent establishment of the 
term loan facility, which is secured by the Canadian-
dollar non-mortgage loan portfolios of LVTS direct 
participants. In these ways, the Bank implemented 
tools designed for particular market dislocations.
In providing liquidity during the crisis, the Bank relied 
heavily on buyback transactions (most notably, term 
PRA). From the Bank’s perspective, these instruments 
are effective because they work through both demand 
and supply channels, but take on much less credit 
risk than an outright purchase. That is, counterparties 
that have access to central bank funding through 
PRAs should be more willing to extend term funding 
to other ﬁ  nancial institutions and will have less 
precautionary demand for funding, since they have a 
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broader ﬁ  nancial market conditions. Because it has 
been the workhorse of the Bank’s extraordinary 
liquidity facilities, most of the discussion is related to 
the regular term PRA facility.
Regular Term PRA
Participation: This facility has been used intensively 
by eligible participants, particularly during periods of 
stress in domestic short-term funding markets. Until 
the spring of 2009, the rate of participation at each 
operation was typically about 70 per cent of those 
eligible, indicating strong and widespread demand. 
From May 2009 onwards, however, the participation 
rate dropped steadily as other alternatives to central 
bank funding became more cost-effective. 
Bidding behaviour at the regular term PRA auctions 
has also reﬂ  ected the demand for central bank 
funding, as measured by the bid-to-coverage ratio. As 
Chart 5 illustrates, until the spring of 2009, the 
bid-to-coverage ratio ranged from about 1.5 to 2.5. 
The highest ratio was reached early in the crisis, but 
at that time the amount of funds offered by the Bank 
under the regular term PRA was relatively small, 
ranging from $1 billion to $2 billion. From October 
2008 to July 2009, the auction sizes were greater, 
reaching as much as $12 billion, and bids submitted 
at individual auctions peaked at $19 billion. As the 
availability of shorter-term funds in the market 
improved in the spring of 2009, the bid-to-coverage 
ratio at the 1- and 3-month regular term PRA 
dropped. In contrast, bid-to-coverage ratios for the 
longer maturities recovered to levels seen earlier in 
the period, particularly once auction amounts were 
signiﬁ  cantly reduced. Demand was higher for the 
newly introduced 6-, 9- and 12-month term funding, 
since auction participants wanted to lock in longer-
term funding at attractive rates.
In sum, both participation rates and bidding behaviour 
reﬂ  ected the changing demand for the regular term 
PRA facility as market conditions evolved over the 
period.
Securities used: A wide range of securities has been 
used in the regular term PRAs. As Chart 6 shows, 
GoC securities typically made up less than 5 per cent 
of the securities used to acquire funds under the 
Principle (v): Mitigate moral hazard
23 
The Bank of Canada has taken several precautions to 
mitigate the creation of perverse incentives that could 
adversely inﬂ  uence market behaviour. As noted 
above, the Bank intervened only in response to 
speciﬁ  c, extraordinary episodes of heightened 
liquidity pressures. Moreover, the liquidity facilities 
were introduced as temporary measures to reduce 
the incentives for eligible participants to change their 
behaviour. The Bank has also worked closely with 
the Ofﬁ  ce of the Superintendent of Financial Institu-
tions, as well as with the federal Department of 
Finance and other domestic bodies that share infor-
mation and coordinate actions on ﬁ  nancial sector 
policy, to monitor the liquidity conditions and risk 
management of major ﬁ  nancial institutions. As well, 
the Bank has monitored the results of each liquidity 
operation. With this and other ﬁ  nancial market infor-
mation (for example, spreads between CDOR and OIS 
rates), the Bank determines the appropriate minimum 
and actual auction amounts so that the availability 
of liquidity varies according to market conditions; 
i.e., with amounts increasing/decreasing only when 
conditions warrant. Finally, where applicable, the 
pricing of new facilities was constructed to preserve 
incentives to transact in private sector markets. For 
example, the minimum bid rates on the PRA facility 
for money market participants and the term loan 
facility were set to ensure that these facilities were 
only used as a backstop.
The Bank has taken several 
precautions to mitigate the creation 
of perverse incentives that could 
adversely inﬂ  uence market behaviour.
Use of the Bank of Canada’s 
Liquidity Facilities
This section considers use of the regular term PRA 
facility, the term PRA facility for money market instru-
ments, the term PRA facility for private sector instru-
ments, and the term loan facility, and discusses how 
23 Moral hazard is the prospect that a party protected from risk will 
behave differently from the way it would behave if it were fully 
exposed to the risk and, in particular, with less regard for the 
consequences of its actions, expecting another party to bear the 
consequences of those actions.
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provided an important alternative source of funding 
for ﬁ  nancial institutions, particularly when market-
based funding for these assets was scarce.
Pricing: Other things being equal, the more aggres-
sive the bidding for central bank funds (i.e., the higher 
the term PRA bid rates relative to the interest rate on 
market sources of funds), the greater the demand for 
the facility. In a PRA transaction, the Bank buys 
eligible securities from its counterparty and agrees to 
sell the securities back to the counterparty at the end 
of the term. As such, PRAs are a form of secured or 
collateralized lending. The difference between the 
average term PRA bid rate and the market rate on 
short-term, unsecured bank borrowing (represented 
by CDOR) is an indication of the degree to which 
participants needed or preferred to obtain liquidity 
from the central bank, particularly since central bank 
liquidity can only be obtained on a secured basis.
26 
As well, the difference between the average term PRA 
bid rate, secured by a range of eligible securities, and 
the market rate on lending that is secured by GoC 
securities (represented by the OIS rate) provides a 
measure of the difﬁ  culty participants face obtaining 
funds secured by less-liquid securities.
27 In general, 
26 One would expect secured lending rates to be lower than unsecured 
lending rates, because the collateral exchanged reduces the lender’s 
risk of ﬁ  nancial loss; i.e., the spread between the average term PRA 
bid rates and CDOR rates would be negative.
27 OIS rates approximate the General Collateral repo rate over the term, 
where General Collateral in Canada is GoC securities. Therefore, the 
spread between the average term PRA bid rate and the OIS rate 
compares the cost of funding a range of (largely non-GoC) securities 
relative to the cost of funding GoC securities. One would expect this 
spread to be positive.
regular term PRA.
24 Increased aversion to liquidity risk 
meant that only the most liquid securities—GoC 
securities—could be funded in the market during the 
peak periods of ﬁ  nancial market distress. As ﬁ  nancial 
market conditions eased, participants continued to 
conserve their GoC securities for market funding 
rather than for central bank funding purposes. Con-
sequently, less-liquid, but still high-quality securities 
issued by public sector entities have been heavily 
used in regular term PRA transactions with the Bank 
of Canada, including National Housing Act Mortgage-
Backed Securities, Canada Mortgage Bonds issued 
by the Canada Housing Trust, and provincial govern-
ment-issued and guaranteed bonds. Corporate 
bonds, corporate paper (including BAs), and ABCP 
have also been used to secure term PRA funding 
since they became eligible in the fall of 2008. These 
securities constitute about 30 per cent of those used 
during the most severe periods of market dislocation. 
ABCP represents a relatively small proportion of the 
securities used, indicating, in part, the signiﬁ  cant 
decline in new issuance that occurred after July 2007. 
As this occurred, primary dealers reduced their 
market-making and, correspondingly, their holdings 
in these securities.
25 Overall, the types of securities 
24 From December 2007 to June 2008, eligible securities for the regular 
term PRA facility included GoC-issued and guaranteed securities, 
provincial government-issued and guaranteed securities, and 
ﬁ  nancial corporate securities (BAs, bearer deposit notes). In the fall 
of 2008, this list was broadened to include non-ﬁ  nancial corporate 
debt securities (commercial paper and investment-grade corporate 
bonds), own-issued ABCP of banks (subject to certain conditions, 
such as high credit quality), and U.S. Treasury securities. 
25 The market value of outstanding bank-issued ABCP declined from 
about $85 billion in July 2007 to about $36 billion by the end of 
August 2009. 
Chart 5:  Term PRA: Auction size and bid-to-
coverage ratios



























Chart 6:  Distribution of securities purchased under 
the regular term PRA facility


















Source: Bank of Canada
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funding via the Bank’s regular term PRA facility. 
As Chart 7 illustrates, from December 2007 to early 
2009, the average bid rate at the 1-month regular term 
PRA auction was about 20 to 25 basis points lower 
than 1-month CDOR rates, although this negative 
spread was 30 basis points or more at several points 
during periods of ﬁ  nancial market stress. In compari-
son, bids at the 3-month regular term PRA auction 
were higher than CDOR rates at the peak of the 
turmoil in the fall of 2008 (Chart 8), resulting in a 
positive spread. Although this seems counterintuitive, 
this positive spread suggests that there was a signiﬁ  -
cant demand for central bank funding during the 
market dysfunction. While 3-month BA rates (used to 
derive CDOR rates) were quoted over the fall of 2008, 
in fact, the ability of ﬁ  nancial institutions to transact in 
these markets, particularly in October 2008, was very 
limited; i.e., market quotes were not reliable. At that 
time, interbank lending markets were dysfunctional in 
most major countries. In Canada, activity was almost 
exclusively limited to terms of one month or less, and 
only against the most liquid collateral. Such market 
conditions were also evidenced by the spread 
between the average bid rate and the OIS rate. These 
spreads widened considerably during this period, 
peaking in early October at 55 basis points for the 
1-month regular term PRA and at 132 basis points for 
the 3-month term. The bids received at the term PRA 
auctions indicate that auction participants were highly 
motivated to fund their less-liquid securities through 
the Bank of Canada.
As these extreme market conditions settled down in 
early 2009, bidding at the regular term PRA auctions 
became much less aggressive, and spreads against 
market funding rates eventually stabilized within a 
relatively narrow range for both the 1- and 3-month 
terms. By the summer of 2009, average bids were 
15 to 20 basis points lower than CDOR rates, and the 
spreads against OIS rates were well under 5 basis 
points. This continued into the fall of 2009. Overall, 
bidding at the Bank’s term PRA auctions between 
2007 and 2009 reﬂ  ected the relative degree of stress 
experienced in term money markets over this period.
Market conditions: In examining the evolution of 
market rates for short-term funding in Canada over 
the 2007–09 period, it appears that the Bank’s regular 
term PRA facility helped to improve the supply and 
distribution of term liquidity during periods of elevated 
ﬁ  nancial market stress and, more generally, helped 
these markets to continue to function. At ﬁ  rst, partici-
pation in the Bank’s regular term PRA operations was 
a means for Canadian ﬁ  nancial institutions to support 
their liquidity management at key points in the funding 
calendar in late 2007 and early 2008. Within a month 
of the introduction of the term PRA facility in December 
2007, bank funding costs had stabilized, as demon-
strated by spreads of CDOR over the expected 
overnight rate (Chart 3). Although the Bank of Can-
ada’s term PRA operations had been welcomed by 
the participants, at that time the operations may have 
had only a modest positive impact because the 
amounts were small ($1 billion to $2 billion) and were 
offered on a limited schedule, commensurate with the 
relatively strong liquidity position of eligible Canadian 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. However, there was a commit-
Chart 7:  1-month regular term PRA: Spreads 
between the average bid rate and the market rate
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Chart 8:  3-month regular term PRA: Spreads 
between the average bid rate and the market rate
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and Term PRA for Private Sector 
Instruments
The term PRA facility for money market instruments 
was implemented to support money market partici-
pants (other than primary dealers and LVTS partici-
pants) who were unable to obtain funding from typical 
market sources because ABCP, BA, and CP markets 
were not functioning normally. From its introduction, 
participation was modest, and a small amount of term 
liquidity was provided under this facility. Only $25 mil-
lion (the minimum allowable bid size) was outstanding 
on a fairly consistent basis until the end of January 
2009 (Chart 4).
The term PRA facility for money 
market instruments was designed to 
be a backstop for private sector 
alternatives, and the minimum bid 
rate was set accordingly.
The likely reason for the modest use of this facility is 
that conditions in shorter-term money markets were 
not stressed enough to motivate a larger group of 
potential counterparties to participate; i.e., market 
funding could still be obtained. The facility was 
designed to be a backstop for private sector 
alternatives, and the minimum bid rate was set 
accordingly.
30 Another reason may be related to 
eligible participants: Only ﬁ  rms with signiﬁ  cant activity 
in private sector money markets (and later, bond 
markets) could participate, and then only indirectly, by 
submitting bids through a primary dealer. The latter 
point may have deterred some potential counter-
parties from participating to avoid providing sensitive 
information to a primary dealer, which, in some cases, 
may have been a competitor. It may have also been 
the case that the initial list of eligible securities was 
not broad enough to encompass those sectors of the 
corporate market that were most in need of support.
With these factors in mind, the Bank announced in 
February 2009 that it would replace this facility with 
30 The minimum bid rate was originally set as a spread of 75 basis 
points above the OIS rate. When the facility was replaced in March 
2009, the minimum bid rate was decreased to 25 basis points above 
the greater of the OIS rate and the OIS rate plus the difference 
between the average yield of the preceding regular term PRA auction 
and the OIS rate for that operation. As indicated in the Box, the 
minimum rate was amended in April.
ment by the Bank to adjust its term liquidity oper-
ations according to the Bank’s assessment of ﬁ  nan-
cial conditions.
As discussed above, the Bank of Canada’s actions 
intensiﬁ  ed in late 2008 as term funding pressures 
became more acute, and this likely had a larger 
impact on funding markets. In September 2008, 
CDOR-OIS spreads spiked higher by 60 basis points 
for 1-month terms (80 basis points for 3-month terms). 
The Bank reintroduced term PRAs on 19 September 
2008, for larger amounts and on a more frequent 
basis, and within four weeks had injected over $20 
billion of term liquidity into the ﬁ  nancial system. The 
amount auctioned at the 15 October operation was 
substantial, $10 billion, and within the week CDOR 
spreads had fallen signiﬁ  cantly (by about 40 basis 
points for the 1- and 3-month terms). The pace of 
term liquidity operations was maintained, and 1- and 
3-month CDOR spreads began to stabilize towards 
the end of 2008.
28 Notwithstanding usual year-end 
pressures,
29 by early 2009, CDOR spreads for 1- and 
3-month terms had returned to a range of 20–40 basis 
points, and anecdotal evidence pointed to more 
normal conditions in short-term money markets.
Following the 21 April reduction in the Bank of 
Canada’s target overnight rate to the effective lower 
bound and the corresponding changes in its operat-
ing framework for monetary policy, funding conditions 
in Canada continued to improve into the fall of 2009. 
Regular term PRA operations maintained the amount 
of outstanding term liquidity between $25 and 
$30 billion. One- and 3-month CDOR-OIS spreads fell 
further and quickly stabilized into a very tight range 
over the summer and fall of 2009. Similar effects were 
also evident for longer-term money market rates. With 
the provision of 6- and 12-month term liquidity (and 
later, 9-month terms) by the Bank, CDOR spreads at 
these terms moved closer to shorter-term spreads—a 
direct result of the Bank’s conditional commitment to 
keep its target overnight rate at ¼ per cent until the 
end of June 2010. Overall, CDOR spreads since May 
2009 have remained relatively close to pre-crisis 
levels and, more generally, ﬁ  nancial institutions are 
facing more-normal funding conditions.
28 Federal government initiatives also contributed signiﬁ  cantly to the 
stabilization of Canadian ﬁ  nancial markets (see Appendix 2). In 
addition, actions taken by other central banks and governments had 
a positive impact on global ﬁ  nancial markets, from which Canada 
also beneﬁ  ted.
29 Another factor that weighed on Canadian money markets towards 
the end of 2008 was concern related to the protracted restructuring 
of non-bank-sponsored ABCP trusts in Canada. 
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added corporate bonds to short-term corporate 
securities. The minimum bid rate was also reduced. 
Bidding through primary dealers was preserved, as 
mentioned earlier, to uphold the traditional structure of 
market-making in Canada. Despite the changes, the 
number of participants and the value of transactions 
was still relatively small, although participating institu-
tions did increase the value of their submitted bids up 
to the maximum allowable. The amount of term 
funding allocated under the facility did rise modestly, 
to a peak of about $3 billion in the early summer of 
2009 (Chart 4). Thereafter, participation waned, with 
several auctions receiving no bids at all. Because of 
the improvement in funding conditions for eligible 
participants, this facility was terminated at the end of 
October 2009.
Term Loan Facility
The term loan facility was designed to support LVTS 
direct participants in the management of their balance 
sheets in order to improve conditions in money and 
credit markets. For only a brief period at the end of 
2008 was there any take-up of the Bank’s regular 
weekly offering of 1-month term loans to LVTS direct 
participants. At its peak in early December 2008, 
funds outstanding from the term loan facility reached 
over $4 billion, but gradually subsided to zero after the 
end of 2008 (Chart 4).
This facility was also designed to be a backstop, with 
pricing and terms and conditions set accordingly.
31 In 
addition, all eligible participants had access to the 
Bank’s regular term PRA facility.
32 As a result, the low 
level of demand for the term loan facility can be 
interpreted as indicating that these ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions had no serious difﬁ  culties obtaining term funding 
from other sources. Despite the lack of take-up, the 
Bank honoured its commitment to conduct weekly 
auctions of term loans to eligible institutions until the 
end of October 2009.
Summing up
As the preceding review shows, the regular term PRA 
facility was heavily used and appears to have contrib-
uted to reduced market stress and a return to well-
31 The minimum bid rate was set at the Bank Rate, which is the 
minimum rate against which the Bank can lend under the Bank of 
Canada Act.
32 Institutions eligible for the term loan facility were LVTS direct 
participants who had pledged their Canadian-dollar non-mortgage 
loan portfolios to the Bank as collateral for LVTS and Standing 
Liquidity Facility purposes.
functioning money markets. In contrast, there was 
relatively little demand or need for funding from the 
term PRA facility for money market instruments, the 
term PRA facility for private sector instruments, and 
the term loan facility, which were designed as back-
stops. Notwithstanding the general lack of use of the 
latter set of facilities, these arrangements provided 
liquidity support for some participants during the 
most difﬁ  cult phases of the crisis, and thus may have 
mitigated subsequent disruptions speciﬁ  cally related 
to these institutions. As well, the presence of these 
facilities to the end of October 2009 helped to mitigate 
uncertainty among market participants about the 
availability of liquidity, if necessary.
Outstanding Issues
The global ﬁ  nancial crisis has subsided, and ﬁ  nancial 
conditions have improved signiﬁ  cantly over the past 
six months, not just in Canada, but globally. Central 
banks and governments are now looking beyond the 
crisis, and are working to build a more resilient global 
ﬁ  nancial system with the necessary market infrastruc-
ture, policies, and regulation. Canada is an active con-
tributor to the G–20 agenda, working with its domes-
tic and international partners in a wide range of 
areas.
33 With respect to the extraordinary actions 
discussed in this article, there are three topics on 
which the Bank of Canada is currently focused.
First, the Bank is interested in studying in more depth 
the effects of its extraordinary liquidity facilities on 
behaviour and, more generally, on the domestic 
ﬁ  nancial system. A more rigorous empirical assess-
ment should be made of the effects of the facilities 
during the ﬁ  nancial crisis. In particular, it would be 
useful to determine the contribution of these facilities 
to mitigating the adverse effects of the crisis, com-
pared with other potential contributing factors, such 
as actions taken by domestic ﬁ  nancial institutions to 
improve their balance sheets, as well as actions taken 
by public authorities domestically and internationally 
to stabilize the global ﬁ  nancial system. A comparison 
of Canada’s experience with those of other countries 
that implemented extraordinary liquidity measures 
might also be useful. Further analysis could also 
assess the impact on the future behaviour of ﬁ  nancial 
market participants, and, in particular, whether these 
actions generated moral hazard. Attention should also 
be devoted to whether the particular design of the 
33 See Bank of Canada (2009) and Carney (2009) for an overview of the 
G–20 strategy.
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ﬁ  nancial markets, and, hence, a resilient ﬁ  nancial 
system, to support endogenous liquidity creation and 
to reduce the probability of ﬁ  nancial stress requiring 
central bank intervention. To this end, work is continu-
ing on an international basis to enhance market and 
institutional resiliency, and thereby reduce the magni-
tude of the effects of future ﬁ  nancial disturbances. For 
example, under the guiding principles of the Financial 
Stability Forum, market incentives, transparency, 
regulation, and oversight are being examined in 
relation to leverage and liquidity.
34 The Bank will also 
continue to work to identify and communicate key 
emerging structural vulnerabilities in the global and 
domestic ﬁ  nancial markets that are relevant to Can-
adian ﬁ  nancial stability, including via its twice yearly 
Financial System Review. Similarly, the Bank will also 
provide leadership in the development of relevant poli-
cies and core market infrastructures so that these 
core markets are continuously open and the liquidity 
of the ﬁ  nancial system is not compromised by similar 
events.
35
34 Duguay (2008), for example, discusses strengthening the resiliency 
of the ﬁ  nancial system.
35 Carney (2008b) discusses the importance of supporting continuously 
functioning core markets.
auction mechanisms used in the facilities were the 
most useful to facilitate price discovery and competi-
tion in bidding.
Second, this research could be used to inform 
questions related to the design of liquidity policies. In 
particular, one could ask (with the beneﬁ  t of hindsight) 
whether the range of liquidity facilities that were 
developed was necessary and efﬁ  cient. In addition, 
while these various facilities were designed as tem-
porary arrangements, would it be appropriate to make 
available some form of liquidity facility on an ongoing, 
permanent basis so as to facilitate continuous func-
tioning of core markets? If so, what mechanisms 
might be required to reduce the risk that central bank 
facilities, if used for extended periods, adversely 
affect the behaviour of ﬁ  nancial institutions? If not, 
how should the Bank maintain sufﬁ  cient ﬂ  exibility and 
readiness to respond to potential future liquidity 
challenges?
Work is continuing on an 
international basis to enhance 
market and institutional resiliency, 
and thereby reduce the magnitude 
of the effects of future ﬁ  nancial 
disturbances.
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Term PRA for 
Private Sector Money Market 
Instruments
Term PRA for Private 
Sector Instruments Term Loan Facility
Date 
announced
12 December 2007; 
modiﬁ  ed most recently: 
22 September 2009
14 October 2008; 
effective 27 October 2008. 
Discontinued 16 March 2009b
23 February 2009; 
effective 16 March 2009. 
Discontinued after 
27 October 2009
12 November 2008. 
Discontinued after 
28 October 2009
Purpose Temporary facility to provide liquidity 
in support of the efﬁ cient functioning 
of ﬁ  nancial markets and modiﬁ  ed on 
21 April 2009 to also reinforce the 
BoC’s conditional statement regarding 
the expected future path of the target 
overnight rate
Temporary facility to support 
liquidity in private sector money 
market instruments. This facility 
was replaced by the Term PRA for 
Private Sector Instruments. 
Temporary facility to support 
liquidity in markets for private 
sector instruments
Temporary term loan facility 
to give LVTS participants 
increased ﬂ  exibility in the 
management of their bal-
ance sheets and to improve 




Canadian PDs in GoC securities and 
direct participants in the LVTS 
PDs on a direct basis and money 
market participants on an indirect 
basis who can demonstrate sig-
niﬁ cant activity in the Canadian-
dollar private sector money 
markets and who are subject to 
federal or provincial regulation 
Institutions that can demon-
strate signiﬁ  cant activity in the 
Canadian private sector money 
and/or bond markets and that 
are subject to federal or provin-
cial regulation





Securities issued or guaranteed by 
the Government of Canada; securities 
issued or guaranteed by a provincial 
government; BAs and promissory notes; 
CP and short-term municipal paper; 
ABCP that meets the BoC’s eligibility 
criteria; corporate and municipal bonds. 
On a temporary basis: afﬁ  liated ABCP 
that meets the BoC’s criteria. Securities 
are subject to credit and other criteria.
BAs, CP, ABCP that meets the 
BoC’s eligibility criteria, promis-
sory notes. Securities are subject 
to credit and other criteria. 
BAs, CP, and ABCP that meet 
the BoC’s eligibility criteria, 
promissory notes, corporate 
bonds. Securities are subject 
to credit and other criteria. 
Canadian-dollar non-mort-
gage loan portfolios, subject 
to credit and other criteria.
Haircuts  Margin requirements available at: 
<http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/
ﬁ  nancial/securities.pdf> 
See margin requirements 
(URL in Column 1) 
See margin requirements  
(URL in Column 1)
See margin requirements  




Multiple-yield competitive auction for 
a ﬁ xed par Canadian-dollar amount. 
Introduced minimum and maximum bid 
rates on 21 April 2009. Minimum bid 
rate: lower end of the operating band 
(25 basis points). Maximum bid rate: 
Bank Rate (50 bps) 
Multiple-yield competitive auction 
for a ﬁ xed par Canadian-dollar 
amount, subject to a minimum bid 
rate set at a spread of 75 bps over 
the average of the BoC’s target 
overnight rate and the 1-month 
OIS rate as observed by the Bank 
Multiple-yield competitive auc-
tion for a ﬁ xed par Canadian-
dollar amount, subject to a 
minimum bid rate set at a 
spread of 25 bps over the 
target overnight rate
Single-price auction for a 
ﬁ xed par Canadian-dollar 
amount. Minimum bid rate: 
Bank Rate. All winning bids 
will pay the minimum ac-
cepted yield. 
Term  1, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months  2 weeks  1 and 3 months  1 month 
Frequency  Biweekly Weekly  Weekly  Weekly 
a.  Full details regarding eligible securities are available at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/ﬁ  nancial/securities.pdf> .
b.  As of16 March 2009, this facility was replaced by the Term PRA for Private Sector Instruments.
Legend: ABCP = asset-backed commercial paper; BAs = bankers’ acceptances; BoC = Bank of Canada; CP = commercial paper; CPA = Canadian Payments Association; 
ELB = effective lower bound; GoC = Government of Canada; LLR = Lender of Last Resort; LVTS = Large Value Transfer System; OIS = overnight index swap; 
PDs = primary dealers; SLF = Standing Liquidity Facility
Appendix 1: Bank of Canada Liquidity Facilities
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ments (SRAs)/Special Purchase 
and Resale Agreements (SPRAs)
Overnight Standing 








Used since mid-1994 21 April 2009
Purpose Permanent tool of the BoC 
standard operating framework 
for the implementation of mon-
etary policy. Used to reinforce 
the target overnight rate at the 
midpoint of the operating band. 
Under the ELB, SRAs would 
be used to reinforce the target 
overnight rate, which is the 
lower end of the operating band.
Temporary facility as 
part of the operating 
framework for the imple-
mentation of monetary 
policy at the ELB. This 
facility provides a funding 
backstop to PDs, similar 
to the overdraft facility for 
LVTS participants. 
Permanent facility as part of the BoC’s 
operating framework for the implementa-
tion of monetary policy and of the BoC’s 
LLR framework. This facility aims to sup-
port settlement in the payments system 
by providing collateralized overnight loans 
to direct participants in the payments 
system who are experiencing temporary 
shortfalls in their settlement balances.
Permanent facility, part of the 
BoC’s LLR framework. This facil-
ity provides extraordinary credit 
support to solvent institutions that 




PDs for GoC securities PDs for GoC securities Direct participants in the LVTS Federally incorporated deposit-
taking institutions that are CPA 
members that are solvent but 
face persistent liquidity problems 
and, in the case of an extraordin-
ary and widespread event that 
would have signiﬁ  cant adverse 
consequences for a provincial 
credit union or caisse populaire 
system, the Credit Union Central 
of Canada, a provincial credit 
union central, the Caisse centrale 





GoC securities GoC securities Securities issued or guaranteed by the 
Government of Canada, GoC stripped 
coupons and residuals, securities issued 
or guaranteed by a provincial government, 
BAs, and promissory notes, CP and short-
term municipal paper, corporate, munici-
pal and foreign-issuer bonds, marketable 
securities issued by the U.S. Treasury, 
ABCP that meets the BoC’s eligibility cri-
teria, and Special Deposit Accounts held 
at the Bank. Effective 20 October 2008 
through to 1 February 2010, Canadian-
dollar non-mortgage loan portfolios are 
also fully eligible. Securities are subject to 
credit and other criteria.
The BoC is willing to accept 
a broader range of collateral 
than for the SLF, including the 
Canadian-dollar non-mortgage 
loan portfolios, subject to credit 
and other criteria.
Haircuts  Margin requirements available 
at: <http://www.bankofcanada.
ca/en/ﬁ  nancial/securities.pdf>
See margin requirements 
(URL in Column 1)
See margin requirements 
(URL in Column 1)
See margin requirements 
(URL in Column 1)
Pricing Overnight Target Rate Bank Rate Bank Rate Minimum rate is the Bank Rate.
Term  Overnight  Overnight  Overnight  Maximum term to maturity: 
6 months 
Frequency  As required  Standing Facility  Standing Facility  As approved by BoC. Actual use 
is very rare. 
a.  Full details regarding eligible securities are available at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/ﬁ  nancial/securities.pdf> .
Legend: ABCP = asset-backed commercial paper; BAs = bankers’ acceptances; BoC = Bank of Canada; CP = commercial paper; CPA = Canadian Payments Association; 
ELB = effective lower bound; GoC = Government of Canada; LLR = Lender of Last Resort; LVTS = Large Value Transfer System; OIS = overnight index swap; 
PDs = primary dealers; SLF = Standing Liquidity Facility
Appendix 1: Bank of Canada Liquidity Facilities (cont’d)
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Government of Canada introduced a number of 
measures to respond to gaps in credit markets by 
providing up to $200 billion to improve access to 
ﬁ  nancing for Canadian households and businesses. 
One of the key measures is the Insured Mortgage 
Purchase Program (IMPP), under which the govern-
ment purchases, through the Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation, pools of insured residential 
mortgages from Canadian ﬁ  nancial institutions. As 
uncertainty in global ﬁ  nancial markets swelled, the 
ability of Canadian ﬁ  nancial institutions to fund their 
lending activity became impaired. Through the IMPP, 
these institutions could mobilize assets on their 
balance sheet and obtain a signiﬁ  cant and stable 
means of long-term ﬁ  nancing. Thus, the IMPP 
enabled ﬁ  nancial institutions to continue to provide 
credit to Canadian households, businesses, and the 
economy. The IMPP was complementary to the 
provision of extraordinary liquidity by the Bank of 
Canada, which, by virtue of the Bank of Canada Act, 
is legally restricted from acquiring an interest in 
mortgages.
A summary of the initiatives taken by the federal 
government in response to the ﬁ  nancial crisis is 
presented in chronological order below.
July 2008: CMHC’s Canada Mortgage Bonds  • 
(CMB) Program was expanded to add a 10-year 
maturity.
October 2008: The IMPP was introduced to  • 
purchase, through the Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation (CMHC), up to $25 billion in 
insured mortgage pools.
The maximum amount was subsequently    –
raised to $75 billion in November 2008 and to 
$125 billion in January 2009.
About $66 billion in mortgages had been    –
purchased by the end of October.
October 2008: The Canadian Lenders Assurance  • 
Facility (CLAF) was set up as a temporary facility to 
provide insurance on the wholesale borrowing of 
federally regulated (and elegible, provincially 
regulated) deposit-taking institutions. This was 
undertaken to ensure that Canadian institutions 
were not put at a competitive disadvantage relative 
to foreign competitors when raising funds in whole-
sale markets. It has not been used to date.
November 2008: The Ofﬁ  ce of the Superintendent  • 
of Financial Institutions (OSFI) announced that the 
limit for preferred shares within the capital rules for 
OSFI-regulated institutions would increase to 
40 per cent.
December 2008: The Canadian and Ontario  • 
governments jointly announced ﬁ  nancial assist-
ance to the automotive sector via a $4 billion loan 
facility to the Canadian subsidiaries of General 
Motors and Chrysler. Between 30 March and 
15 July 2009, a total of USD $12.4 million was 
disbursed.
January 2009: The Canadian Secured Credit  • 
Facility (CSCF) was introduced in the 2009–2010 
Federal Budget to purchase up to $12 billion in 
newly securitized term asset-backed securities 
(ABS) backed by loans and leases on vehicles and 
equipment. The facility is managed by the Busi-
ness Development Bank of Canada (BDC).  
January 2009: Changes were made to improve the  • 
capacity of the Canada Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (CDIC) to respond to troubled ﬁ  nancial 
institutions:
CDIC’s borrowing limit was increased from    –
$6 to $15 billion;
CDIC was allowed the ability to establish a    –
bridge institution as an additional resolution 
tool.
January 2009: The Business Credit Availability  • 
Program (BCAP) was introduced to improve 
access to ﬁ  nancing for Canadian businesses by 
providing new resources and ﬂ  exibilities to Export 
Development Canada (EDC) and the Business 
Development Bank of Canada (BDC), combined 
with enhanced co-operation between private 
sector lenders and those Crown corporations.
The government injected an additional    –
$350 million in capital in both EDC and BDC.
EDC’s and BDC’s borrowing limits were    –
increased.
EDC’s mandate was temporarily expanded to    –
enable it to support ﬁ  nancing in the domestic 
market.
May 2009: The Canadian Life Insurers Assurance  • 
Facility (CLIAF) was established as a temporary 
Appendix 2: Federal Government Initiatives in Response to the 
Financial Crisis
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borrowing of federally regulated life insurers. This 
was undertaken to ensure that Canadian institu-
tions were not put at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to foreign competitors when raising funds 
in wholesale markets. It has not been used to date.
Appendix 2: Federal Government Initiatives in Response to the 
Financial Crisis (cont’d)
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